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FOREWORD

As mediation and mine action practitioners we live in very different worlds that
only rarely coincide. In the field of mine action, we aspire to clear the land of
explosive devices that pose a risk to human life. In the field of mediation, we
search for ways out of armed conflicts that ravage in many parts of this world.
However, despite our differences, we both dedicate our time and efforts to
creating opportunities for people to live in peace and security. We are working
towards similar objectives and our work is needed more than ever with the
number of armed conflicts rising again after years of steady decline. With this in
mind, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and
the Swiss Peace Foundation (swisspeace) initiated a research project exploring
the potential opportunities and challenges of a closer and mutually beneficial
cooperation between peace mediation and mine action.
In some instances, there are good reasons to keep the two communities of
practice apart from one another, not least considering the humanitarian and
political nature of our work. Today’s conflicts remind us of the risk humanitarian
workers are incurring when they are perceived to serve a political purpose.
However, there are many situations where exchange and collaboration are useful
and indeed warranted. Colombia is a case in point, where the Government and
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC-EP) agreed in March 2015 to conduct a
pilot project in humanitarian demining in order to strengthen confidence in the
peace process. The recent rejection of the final agreements in the popular vote
might be a setback in the overall process, but it does not undermine the value of
the pilot project.
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Mediators and deminers can learn and benefit from one another. Peace mediation
can take advantage of the technical expertise available within the mine action
community, which is often required during negotiations in relation to areas
contaminated by explosive hazards. Mine action can also serve as an entry point
to peace processes by fostering confidence among conflicting parties. At the
same time, mine action can be made more effective, efficient and sustainable
when it is anchored in peace processes. Working in silos should belong to the
past. This publication identifies areas of common interest that deminers and
mediators need to pay attention to in order to make the best use of each other’s
skills and knowledge.
Further work is needed and this paper is a first step towards an open and frank
exchange between our two respective communities of practice, for the benefit of
peace and security.

Ambassador Stefano Toscano		
Professor Laurent Goetschel
GICHD Director				swisspeace Director

Foreword
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ABSTRACT

The humanitarian consequences of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW)
are extensive and long lasting. This fact suggests the relevance of having them
addressed in negotiations among conflict parties and included in ceasefire and
peace agreements. Nevertheless, the link between mine action (also called
humanitarian demining) and peace mediation is underexplored in practice and
theory as is illustrated by the limited guidance and literature on the matter. This
issue brief aims to explore to what extent the two communities of practice could
overcome the tendency of working in isolation and benefit from one another. It
also shows that mine action can indeed contribute to mediation, especially as an
instrument for confidence building and part of broader arms control. Moreover,
mediation can strengthen the case of mine action by anchoring the topic in peace
agreements.
These opportunities are however related to the challenge of linking mine action to
the more politically-oriented agenda of peacemaking and peacebuilding. Notably,
the traditional humanitarian focus that characterises mine action actors in the field,
results in a desire to distance themselves from political engagement in general.
Additionally, mediators are confronted with numerous issues to be included in
their processes and risk overloading them with too many topics. In other words,
there is a reluctance to predetermine what needs to be discussed at the outset
of a mediation process. The authors believe that all those concerns may well
be moderated by facilitating a better mutual understanding and a more direct
engagement between the two fields.
Overall, the study conducted for this issue brief leads to four main
recommendations.
•• First, mine action is a topic that should be addressed in peace mediation

one way or another. This is to say, mediators should consider it as a
possible issue for discussion. Whether this entails its formal inclusion in a
ceasefire or peace agreement should be decided on a case by case basis.
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•• Second, it is important to clearly distinguish mine action before and

after an agreement because this has a significant impact on its goal and
operational scope. Mine action activities before an agreement are primarily
used as entry points for peace processes or as confidence building
measures. As such, they are primarily part of a larger mediation strategy
and serve a humanitarian purpose to a limited extent. The latter point takes
centre stage when mine action is conducted after an agreement, i.e. as
part of its content.

•• Third, mine action provisions in an agreement should be restricted to basic

questions due to the limited knowledge and expertise available during
negotiations. As accurate and detailed information will be sparse, it is
most useful to merely clarify fundamental elements of mine action as well
as respective responsibilities when it comes to the implementation of
activities and build on those commitments moving forward.

•• Fourth, there is the need to build relationships between the two

communities of practice, which appear to operate in silos and have scarce
knowledge of the respective fields of activities. In order to be in a position
to benefit from each other, practitioners should maintain at least some
form of interaction.

Abstract
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INTRODUCTION
This issue brief explores to what extent practitioners working in the fields of
peace mediation and mine action could benefit from one another’s experience and
expertise. It builds on the premise that there are currently only limited contacts
between these two communities of practice, despite the fact that there are
numerous potential interlinkages. Hence, the authors look into possible reasons
behind this, assess areas where a closer cooperation may prove useful and
formulate some recommendations on how to facilitate a better understanding
between experts of mine action and peace mediation.
Although perhaps not always prominently reflected in news coverage of
contemporary violent conflicts, mine action remains to be a topic of great
relevance. Despite long-running efforts to reach a world free of mines, such
weapons, including cluster munitions (CM) and ERW1, continue to be a
considerable problem in many conflict-affected countries. Currently, it is not
possible to provide an accurate estimate of the total contaminated ground,2 but
the scale of the problem is well known. The Landmine Monitor 2015 published
by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)3 says that 57 states and
4 areas in the world are affected by anti-personnel mines (APM).4 Moreover, the
number of victims of APM and ERW reached 3,678 in 2014.5 When it comes to
CM, the ICBL Cluster Munitions Monitor 2015 reports that the contamination
affects 22 countries and 3 other areas and from 2012 to 2014 at least 1,968 victims
were recorded in 13 countries and 92 per cent of them were civilians.6
Mines/ERW harm civilians indiscriminately not only during conflict, but also
years after reaching a settlement. Beyond the direct threat to physical security,
the contamination by mines/ERW has a severe impact on post-conflict recovery
and socio-economic development. In the immediate aftermath of a conflict,
contamination creates an obstacle for the return of refugees and internally
1

In the text, we use the expression mines/ERW to refer to all these weapons. Victim operated
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are also considered when they are ERW.

2

GICHD, Guide to Mine Action, Geneva, GICHD, 2014, p. 21.

3

The ICBL is a global network of non-governmental organizations working for the elimination of antipersonnel mines and it produces annual reports on the contamination around the world. See http://icbl.
org/en-gb/about-us.aspx (accessed 26 November 2015).

4

ICBL, Landmine Monitor 2015, pp. 2, 18. http://www.the-monitor.org/media/2152583/LandmineMonitor-2015_finalpdf.pdf (accessed 26 November 2015).

5

Ibid., p. 25.

6

ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2015, pp. 1, 3. http://the-monitor.org/media/2135498/2015_
ClusterMunitionMonitor.pdf (accessed 26 November 2015)
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displaced people (IDP). In both the medium-term and long-term, mines/ERW
block the development of infrastructure; limit the access to health care, education
and other social services. They also impede the use of assets for sustainable
livelihood such as water sources, land, etc, and deter investments for economic
development.7
It would thus appear plausible that the effects of mines/ERW would come up
regularly in mediation processes, understood in this issue brief as “a process
whereby a third party assists two or more parties, with their consent, to prevent,
manage or resolve a conflict by helping them to develop mutually acceptable
agreements”.8 The connection seems imperative all the more so as a large part
of conflicts that have come to an end over the last 30 years involved mediation,
making it one of the predominant tools used for the peaceful resolution of
conflict.9
Furthermore, the objectives pursued in mediation processes point to the
importance of issues related to mines/ERW. For instance, in its Guidance for
Effective Mediation, the United Nations (UN) holds that “peace agreements
should end violence and provide a platform to achieve a sustainable peace, justice,
security and reconciliation”.10 Even when a comprehensive agreement is not
feasible, negotiations that merely aim to contain violence, for example ceasefire
negotiations, need to address the major instruments used in violent conflict. In
both cases, the question of mines/ERW would seem to be relevant.
The importance of this connection is demonstrated by two of the most
prominent current peace processes, where mine action has been either
undertaken or discussed before the signature of a final peace agreement. The
first case is Colombia, where, in the framework of their peace negotiations,
the Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo – FARC-EP) issued a
joint statement on 7 March 201511 in which they agreed to conduct survey and

7

GICHD, Guide to Mine Action, op. cit., p. 201.

8

United Nations, Guidance for Effective Mediation, New, York, UN, 2012, p.4.

9

According to the School of Culture of Peace in Barcelona, out of the 59 conflicts that have come to
an end in the last 30 years, 74,6 per cent were achieved through peace agreements. Additionally, the
school’s yearbook of peace processes notes that in 79,4 per cent of negotiations, external mediation
was used to facilitate the process. See: Vicenç Fisas, 2015 Yearbook of Peace Processes, Barcelona,
School of Culture of Peace, 2015, p.9.

10

United Nations, Guidance for Effective Mediation, op. cit, p.20.

11

https://www.mesadeconversaciones.com.co/comunicados/comunicado-conjunto-52-la-habana-7-demarzo-de-2015 , (accessed 19 October 2016).
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clearance of mines/ERW with the aim to build confidence and increase security
for the population. The second case is Myanmar,12 where a peace process started
in August 2011. In October 2015, the government and some of the armed groups
signed a ceasefire agreement including a commitment to stop using mines.13
Against this backdrop, this issue brief explores the links and the potential
synergies that mine action and mediation have. It is organised in three parts. The
first part establishes a connection between mine action and mediation by focusing
on the existing literature and by reviewing ceasefire and peace agreements
containing humanitarian demining measures. This first part builds the baseline for
this research, seeking to understand how these two fields have interacted and
how this has been discussed among experts and practitioners. The second part
focuses on identifying practical challenges and opportunities in linking the two
fields and relies on the insights gathered from seven interviews with experienced
practitioners, including senior mediators and representatives of the mine action
community. The conclusion in the third part summarises the findings and presents
some recommendations on possible ways forward to better understand the
interaction between mine action and mediation. More importantly, it provides
practical measures to foster interaction and mutual understanding between the
two communities.

12

swisspeace, “Myanmar at a Crossroads”, Newsletter, no. 142, November 2015. International Crisis
Group, “Myanmar’s Peace Process: A Nationwide Ceasefire Remains Elusive”, Crisis Group Asia
Briefing, no. 146, 16 September 2005.

13

The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Union of
Myanmar and the Ethnic Armed Organizations, 15 October 2015, para 5.e. http://peacemaker.un.org/
sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/NCA-Final-Text.pdf (accessed 18 March 2016).
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PART I: UNPACKING MINE
ACTION AND MEDIATION
This part seeks to establish a reference by showing how mine action and
mediation have so far been connected in theory and practice. As a preliminary
remark, it is worth noting that the literature on this matter is rather limited and
mainly discusses mine action in the framework of overall peacemaking and
peacebuilding if at all. This part also contains an analysis of signed ceasefire and
peace agreements in order to identify the frequency and the content of mine
action provisions in such agreements. Thus, it not only aims at quantifying the
number of agreements containing provisions on mine action, but also at providing
an understanding of the provisions themselves.

MINE ACTION IN PEACEMAKING AND PEACEBUILDING
In terms of appropriate measures to deal with mines/ERW the international
community has developed robust responses in the form of mine action, which
will also be used as a reference point in this issue brief. Mine action is defined as
“activities which aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact
of mines and ERW including unexploded sub-munitions.”14 Thus, mine action
does not involve demining only, but it actually addresses the consequences that
mines/ERW have on populations in order to improve their security and
opportunities for socio-economic development. As such, it needs to be clearly
distinguished from military demining, which merely implies the clearance of
strategically and tactically important areas in a military context. The standard
definition of mine action as used in this issue brief includes five pillars:15
•• Mine/ERW risk education
•• Demining, i.e. mine/ERW survey, mapping, marking and clearance
•• Victim assistance, including rehabilitation and reintegration
•• Stockpile destruction
•• Advocacy against the use of anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions

14

This definition is taken from the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). UNMAS, IMAS 04.10:
Glossary of mine action definitions and abbreviations, 2014, al. 3.176, pp. 24-25. See: http://www.
mineactionstandards.org/fileadmin/MAS/documents/imas-international-standards/english/series-04/
IMAS_04.10_Glossary_of_mine_action_terms__definitions_and_abbreviations.pdf (accessed 26
November 2015).

15

GICHD, Guide to Mine Action, op. cit., p. 27.
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Mine action is a humanitarian activity and there is no specific principle restricting
its activities to conflict or post-conflict environments (see table 1). Thus, mine
action is connected with peacemaking (generally corresponding to sections of
conflict and stabilisation in the table), peacebuilding (priority reconstruction and
assisted development) and development processes. Mediation is primarily used in
peacemaking and to some extent in peacebuilding.

Table 1

Source: GICHD, A Guide to Mine Action, Geneva, GICHD, 2014, p. 37.
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PEACEMAKING
With regard to peacemaking, mine action is particularly difficult in the context of
an active conflict because humanitarian demining requires access to contaminated
areas and a reasonably stable and secure situation that allows conducting
operations, which usually demand a significant amount of time, staff and logistic
capacities. For these reasons, the most common operational environment is
a post-conflict one. However, the literature shows that there are cases of mine
action in conflict contexts and reasons in favour of this practice.
A workshop organised by the international non-governmental organisations
(INGOs) Geneva Call and ICBL in 2005 addressed this topic and produced some
recommendations based on the experience gathered in Colombia, Sudan and Sri
Lanka. Participants emphasised that even though mine action is possible while
a conflict is still ongoing; it must be conducted for strictly humanitarian reasons.
Furthermore, mine action should be depoliticised as political considerations would
negatively affect operations. These conclusions reflect a strong humanitarian
perspective with a focus on the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and
independence and have no explicit link to negotiating efforts yet.
The UN argues that there is a need to formally include mine action into
peacemaking, as the guidelines developed by its Inter-Agency Coordination Group
on Mine Action (IACG-MA) in 200316 provide governments, organisations and
individuals with key technical questions that need to be addressed in ceasefire
and peace agreements. In particular, the guidelines point out that in difficult
cases there is a tendency to include mine action only in vague terms, generating
excessive expectations and without establishing the required mechanisms to
implement mine action programmes. In order to counter this trend, they request
the proper consideration of technical needs for mine action operations.
These guidelines largely reflect the obligations contained in the Anti-Personnel
Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and provide an accurate description of the
technical needs for mine action. Their limitation however lies in the fact that
they lack a mediation perspective and thus do not take into account the specific
challenges and opportunities of discussing mine action in the negotiations
for ceasefire and peace agreements. In other words, the guidelines omit the
problems that mediators may face in discussing mine action with conflict parties.

16

The guideline is based on the recognition that there is little reference to mine action in agreements,
although it is important for the return of IDPs and refugees, the provision of humanitarian aid and
development. (UNMAS), Lignes Directrices pour l’Action Contre les Mines dans le Cadre d’Accords
de Cessez-le-feu et d’Accords de Paix, p. 1. http://www.bibliomines.org/fileadmin/tx_bibliodocs/
MineActionGuidelinesforCeasefireandPeaceAgreements.pdf (accessed 26 November 2015).
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Addressing the issue from a mediation perspective, a study by the Centre for
Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) also supports the principle of integrating mine action
as a topic for negotiations and seeks to provide further guidance for conflict parties
and mediators, which for the moment is still limited.17 The authors state that the
issue of mines/ERW can provide an entry-point for engaging with parties to the
conflict, contribute to building confidence and ultimately they argue that it can
begin before the signature of a peace agreement. The fundamental reason of this
opportunity lies in the fact that mine action “provides a potentially neutral platform
from which parties can agree to meaningful measures, and further engage.”18
However, the HD study also raises some concerns when linking mine action to
mediation efforts. It points out the case of frozen conflicts, in which it may actually
be better to disconnect mine action from peace processes that are blocked. This
has been the case for the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh where the co-chairs of the
Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
deliberately did not include mine action into the formal mediation process. They
did not want to make mine action contingent on overall progress in the peace
process, a decision that today is considered a “blessing”19 as the conflict itself has
been protracted for years. In such cases, it is better to conduct mine action as a
neutral and technical issue to engage with armed groups. This is often done by
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which conduct humanitarian demining
without the risk of diplomatic or political fallout.20 Another risk of mine action in
conflict contexts is that it can “reinforce conflict dynamics and undermine
peacemaking efforts” if it is not addressed properly and according to the specific
features of the context (see box 1).21

PEACEBUILDING
With regard to peacebuilding, the linkage is more obvious as mine action takes
place mostly in post-conflict contexts and is often associated with socio-economic
recovery and development, despite its origin as an emergency response. In this
context, mine action usually involves the establishment of national mine action
programmes and support for reconstruction projects,22 which address broader
issues, including for instance access to health care, education and other basic
services.
17

LeBrun, Emile, Damman Suzanne, “Addressing explosive ordnance in peace processes”, Briefing paper,
no. 2, 2009, p. 5.

18

Ibid., p. 12.

19

Ibid., p. 8.

20

Elisabeth Reusse-Decrey: “The Struggle Against Landmines: An Opening for Peace Talks in Colombia”,
Accord 16, 2005, p.4.

21

LeBrun, Emile, Damman Suzanne, “Addressing explosive ordnance in peace processes”, op. cit., 2009,
p. 11.

22

GICHD, Guide to Mine Action, op. cit., pp. 198-201.
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Box 1: Senegal
Senegal is affected by contamination of APM, anti-vehicle mines (AVM) and ERW.
The contamination is due to the conflict between the Government of Senegal and
the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) and is concentrated
in the Casamance region. The Senegalese National Mine Action Centre (CNAMS),
which was established in 2006, coordinates demining operations in Casamance.
A number of NGOs and commercial operators were active and this allowed
clearance to progress. In 2013, operations approached MFDC controlled-areas and
MFDC leaders publicly called for a halt in demining operations. In particular, during
a direct dialogue in early 2013 between the MFDC and the CNAMS, facilitated
by Geneva Call and a local NGO, MFDC stated that CNAMS had reached a
limit beyond which demining operations constituted a threat to their security
and therefore could put deminers at risk1. However, demining continued, and
subsequently 12 South African deminers working for the company Mechem were
taken hostage on 3 May 2013 and the Government ordered a halt to all survey
and clearance activities until November 2013.2 More broadly, this event marked
a rupture in the positive reconciliation between the parties. The Senegalese case
illustrates the risk of mine action being perceived as a political, strategic or military
activity and potentially doing harm to the overall peace process. It also underlines
the importance of constant information exchange between different levels of
demining activities.
1

RFI Afrique, «Sénégal : seule la paix permettra de parachever le déminage en Casamance», 7 April
2013. http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130407-senegal-casamance-mines-cnams-handicap-internationalmechem (accessed 15 December 2015).

2

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, “Senegal. Mine Action”, http://archives.the-monitor.org/index.
php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/3836 (accessed 15 December 2015).

Nevertheless, the literature shows that such linkages are not immediate either
and mine action is often conducted separately from other components of
peacebuilding processes. Against this background, Harpviken and Roberts say that
mine action can have a “major impact on peace building”23 despite its technical
nature, because the respective activities can influence key political issues relevant
for peacebuilding.

23

Harpviken, Kristian Berg; Roberts, Rebecca: “Introduction”, in Harpviken, Kristian Berg; Roberts,
Rebecca (ed.): “Preparing the Ground for Peace: Mine Action in support of Peacebuilding”, PRIO
Report, no. 2, 2004, p.1. See also Harpviken, Kristian Berg; Skåra, Brent A.: “Humanitarian mine action
and peace building: exploring the relationship”, Third World Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 5, 2003, pp. 809-822.
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The contribution to peacebuilding is not free from challenges either, even though
they may not be as acute as in contexts of active conflict. In fact, in the immediate
post-conflict period, security and confidence are still low and peacebuilding needs
to address the root causes. Thus, mine action’s strictly humanitarian goal may
actually clash with more political peacebuilding priorities. On this matter, according
to Harpviken and Roberts, mine action has to integrate a careful conflict analysis
and be more flexible in terms of priority-setting in order to adapt to the politically
sensitive issues in the peacebuilding agenda.24 In other words, to contribute
effectively to peacebuilding, mine action has to adjust its operations to the
requirements and the priorities of peacebuilding.

FINDINGS FROM THE LITERATURE REVIEW
The review of the current debates on the linkage between mine action,
peacemaking and peacebuilding shows that mine action can be a constructive
factor in establishing and implementing a peace process. However, the linkage
is not problem free since mine action and the promotion of peace have different
goals and requirements. These differences should be taken into account,
otherwise mine action could be detrimental to peace efforts. Four points stand
out from this review:
1. Mine action can take place in conflict contexts; this however does not equate
to a contribution to peace mediation because it may represent a traditional
humanitarian intervention focused on addressing people’s immediate needs.
2. Politicisation is a major risk of connecting mine action with peacemaking
and peacebuilding.25 Undoubtedly, this is the greatest challenge to overcome
because using mine action as a stepping stone for an overarching political
objective and strategy bears the risk of running against the humanitarian
principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.
3. Despite these risks, mine action provides an entry-point to engage with
conflict parties as it is a technical and thus relatively neutral platform for
working with them and offers the opportunity of small scale confidence
building that is not part of the main negotiations.

24

Harpviken, Kristian Berg, Roberts, Rebecca, “Introduction”, in Harpviken, Kristian Berg, Roberts,
Rebecca, (ed. by) “Preparing the Ground for Peace: Mine Action in support of Peacebuilding,” op. cit.,p.
57-60.

25

Ibid., p. 26.
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4. The connection of mine action with peacemaking and peacebuilding requires
flexibility with respect to the criteria used in deciding for the operations.
Priorities must go beyond humanitarian demining needs and also take into
account political considerations.

REVIEW OF CEASEFIRE AND PEACE AGREEMENTS
A research in the UN Peacemaker database26 shows that using key words27 related
to mine action yields a list of 35 agreements that contain meaningful references
to clearance of mines/ERW.
Concerning the temporal distribution of agreements (see table 2); the dataset
analysed shows that mine action has been included in agreements on a regular
basis after the end of the Cold War. In fact, out of the 35 agreements, 30 were
signed after 1989, which corresponds to 85,7 per cent of the total number.
This result may imply that the increasing relevance of humanitarian demining is
connected with the growth of intra-state and civilian conflicts in the post-Cold War
period and matches the history of mine action which emerged in the late 80s with
the first UN appeal for funding and the creation of the first humanitarian demining
NGOs.28
The analysis of the demining measures included in the agreements before
1989 shows that the signatories committed to conducting demining, marking
minefields, providing reports and sharing information on mines/ERW. Overall,
in these agreements demining is rather executed as part of the military
redeployment of forces because it is focused on clearance of defensive measures
put in place during the conflict. Thus, these agreements do not reflect a specific
humanitarian perspective, meaning the elimination of the threat to civilian
population and activities.

26

http://peacemaker.un.org/. The UN peacemaker database contained 807 agreements on 9 December
2015.

27

Key words: landmines, mines, mortars, minefields, demining, mine clearance, arms, disarmament,
weapons, explosives, stockpile, stockpile destruction, weapons storage, ammunition, advocacy,
humanitarian, mine risk education, victim assistance.

28

GICHD, Guide to Mine Action, op. cit., pp. 27-28.
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Table 2 - Distribution of agreements over time1
7

Number of agreements

6
5
4
3
2
1
0

1 Table

2 and 3 were compiled by the GICHD and swisspeace and are based on the annex 3.

After 1989, the agreements show a larger spectrum of measures (see table 3).
These activities reflect the specific humanitarian nature of mine action, such
as mine risk education (MRE), but they also reflect the broadening of tasks
conducted by mine action actors, which is also demonstrated by the link with
storage of weapons and disarmament.
These agreements do not simply ask signatories to stop laying mines and using
other explosive devices, but they actually demand the removal of the threat posed
by such weapons in order to reduce and eliminate the risks to the population.

18
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Table 3 - Topics in agreements1
35
30

Number of agreements

25
20
15
10
5
0

Topics

1 Table

2 and 3 were compiled by the GICHD and swisspeace and are based on the annex 3.
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A closer look at the agreements shows several trends:
1. Humanitarian focus: Some agreements emphasise the humanitarian nature
of demining by explicitly requesting clearance not only in military areas, but
also in the entire country, for the benefit of the whole population and for
specific groups that have been particularly affected by the conflict.29 Another
humanitarian concern is establishing conditions conducive to post-conflict
recovery and development.30 Some agreements also stress the humanitarian
nature of demining by referring explicitly to the international conventions or
commitments against mines/ERW.31
2. Involvement of international actors: In addition to humanitarian and
development imperatives, the presence of an international peace mission
is another aspect often linked to the inclusion of mine action in peace
agreements. A number of agreements state that such missions have
the responsibility to clear contaminated areas or to demand and monitor
demining operations.32 Other agreements also refer to the role of UN
peacekeeping missions and other UN agencies, as was the case in Sudan, for
example.33

29

This perspective is illustrated by the Lusaka Protocol (1994) that says demining is conducted “for
the good of all Angolans”: Lusaka Protocol, Annex 8, point 1.34. Similarly, the Arusha Peace and
Reconciliation Agreement (2000) requires the parties to “ensure demining over the whole country”:
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, Art. 26, al. vi. Other agreements refer directly
to the need to secure the return of displaced people. This is the case of the Paris Agreement (1991),
which puts an end to 20 years of conflict in Cambodia and states the requirement of “clearing of
mines from repatriation routes, reception centres and resettlement areas, as well as in the protection
of the reception centres”: Paris Agreement, 23 October 1991, Annex 2, Art. XIII.

30

See the Zinguinchor Peace Agreement in Senegal (2004), which requires parties to conduct “humane
clearance from Casamance in order to facilitate the resumption of the economic activities”:
Zinguinchor Peace Agreement between the Government of Senegal and the Movement of the
Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC), 2004, Art. 4, al. 1.

31

This is the case of the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in
the Great Lakes Region in which the Parties commit “to promote common policies to put an end to
the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons, as well as APM” and also to “apply the Ottawa
convention on APM”: Dar-es-Salaam Declaration, Point 22 and 64.

32

For instance, the Dayton Agreement (1995) states that parties agree that the tasks of the
Implementation Force (IFOR) call to “monitor the clearing of minefields and obstacles”: General
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (i.e. ‘Dayton Agreement’), 21 November
1995, Art. VI al. 3.e. In the case of the Kosovo war, the Rambouillet Accord (1999) also includes the
parties’ agreement that the Kosovo Force (KFOR) has the right “to require the Parties to mark and
clear minefields and obstacles and to monitor their performance”: Rambouillet Accord, 23 February
1999, Ch. 7, Art. VIII al. 2.e.

33

The Agreement on the Permanent Ceasefire in Sudan of 2004 says that Parties “shall conduct
demining activities as soon as possible and in coordination with the UN Peace Support Mission with a
view to create the conditions necessary for deployment of the UN Peace Support mission“.
In addition, the UN mission has to “assist Parties’ demining efforts by providing technical advice
and coordination”: Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation
modalities during the Pre-Interim and the Interim Periods between the Government of Sudan and the
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, Points 8.6.4 - 8.6.6.
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Another important aspect that creates a link with international peace
missions is the establishment of joint bodies because they include the
presence of international representatives. This can take the form of joint
monitoring commissions, joint military committees or joint operational teams
to conduct monitoring. 34
3. Link to traditional mine action: Activities that are either listed in the five pillars
defining mine action or are considered indispensable for the operations are
often included. This is the case of measures regarding survey, reporting
of mines/ERW, in addition to the exchange of information, which consists
mostly of the provision of minefield maps, description of the type of
mines/ERW and their location. For instance, the Dayton Agreement states
that “each Party shall furnish to the Joint Military Commission information
regarding the positions and descriptions of all known unexploded ordnance,
explosive devices, demolitions, minefields, booby traps, wire entanglements,
and all other physical or military hazards to the safe movement of personnel
within Bosnia and Herzegovina”.35 Another example is the Agreement on the
Implementation of the Peace Agreement in Guatemala (1996), in which it is
stated that “both the Guatemalan armed forces and URNG are to provide the
United Nations with detailed information on explosives, mines and existing
minefields.”36 Associated with the exchange of information, there is often the
requirement of marking dangerous areas.

34

Examples are: Lomé Peace Agreement, Art. II al. 2.; Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security
Arrangements Implementation modalities during the Pre-Interim and the Interim Periods between the
Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, points 8.6.2. and 14.6.3.1;
Nepal: Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies, Point 6.1.1.

35

Dayton Agreement, Art. V. The Joint Military Commission is defined in the article VIII and is a body
that processes “military complaints, questions or problems”, assists the commander of (IFOR), who is
also the chair of the commission. In the context of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the sharing of
information is also requested in the Ceasefire Agreement in Croatia for deploying the United Nations
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) (Cease-fire Agreement of 29 March 1994, Annex B al. 1) and in the
Rambouillet Accord for the deployment of KFO, (Chapter 7, Art. VII al.d).

36

Agreement on the Implementation, Compliance and Verification Timetable for the Peace Agreements,
29 December 1996, Point 13. The URNG is the armed group Unitad Revolucionaria Nacional
Guatemalteca.
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4. Additional support: A fourth finding is that some agreements reaffirm the
parties’ commitment to seek additional support and assistance for conducting
humanitarian demining. This reflects article 6 on international cooperation and
assistance in the APMBC and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM)
and also the awareness of the specific expertise and capabilities required for
these operations, which are not to be confused with military demining, and
the long duration of humanitarian demining operations. This point is illustrated
by the Lusaka Protocol that says the signatories “should seek help from
the UN and specialised institutions to assist them in carrying out demining
operations”.37
5. Disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation (DDR) and security sector
reform (SSR): Some agreements connect mine action with the broader topic
of disarmament, storage and monitoring of arms. These activities are not
traditionally part of mine action, but increasingly undertaken by mine action
actors, who thereby contribute to larger processes of demilitarisation that
take place through DDR and SSR.
A significant example of this pattern is again the Agreement on the
Implementation of the Peace Agreements in Guatemala in 1996, where the
parties’ commitment to provide information on mines/ERW is part of the list
including the number of troops, inventory of weapons and military equipment
possessed or stored by the URNG.38 This agreement also includes the
timeline for the gathering of troops, collection and storing of weapons and
equipment in “warehouses designated by the UN”.39
6. Components rarely mentioned: In the agreements there are some
components of traditional mine action that have received limited attention.
This is the case for MRE and VA.
The analysis of the agreements provides an initial picture on how mine action
is included in mediation. The six points above can be considered as lessons
learned that can be drawn from the agreements concluded in the past. In order to
complete the picture, the second part of this study is dedicated to the analysis of
the experience gathered by practitioners.

37

Lusaka Protocol, Annex 8, Point 1.34.

38

Agreement on the Implementation, Compliance and Verification Timetable for the Peace Agreements,
Point 46.

39

Ibid., Point 53.
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PART II: LINKING MINE
ACTION AND MEDIATION
To establish practical connections, interviews with experts from the field of mine
action and mediation were conducted.40 The interviews revealed two distinct
ways to link mine action and mediation. On the one hand, mine action is used
as an instrument in mediation to advance the process. On the other hand, it can
be introduced into the content to be discussed within a mediation process and
eventually included in an agreement. This part of the issue brief is divided into
three sections. A discussion of the potential of linking mine action and mediation
is followed by an analysis of the two mentioned ways to do so.

MINE ACTION IN MEDIATION: PROS AND CONS
Overall, interviewed experts agreed that especially in intra-state conflicts,
mines/ERW are an important issue. As the “weapon of the poor”, they are used
frequently by both non-state actors, and also by states. Due to the very low price
and easy access, mines are popular for their “cost-efficiency”. Interviewees also
saw IEDs in the range of weapons to be addressed in a disarmament process.
ERW are part of the problem as well because they are used for making IEDs.
Given this strategic and tactical importance of mines/ERW for many conflict
parties, mediators regularly face heavy reluctance when it comes to giving up
the use of such explosive devices, although depending on the context there
are exceptions41. In addition, some interviewees pointed out that openly talking
about mines/ERW may bring about reputational damage. Most conflict parties are
acutely aware of the damage mines/ERW inflict on local populations and are very
sensitive to being portrayed as the ones responsible for this suffering.
Several experts made no distinction between mines/ERW and machine guns
or rifles, arguing that they should in fact be dealt with within the framework of
disarmament, an issue that comes up in every ceasefire or peace negotiation.
They argued that storing and destroying existing stocks of mines/ERW should
naturally be linked to broader arms control efforts. Against this backdrop, the

40

Seven semi-structured interviews of 30-60 minutes were conducted. The list of questions is attached
in Annex 2.

41

Since mines/ERW are a static weapon, they are not overly useful to forces that move around within a
given territory, for instance.
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interviewed experts unanimously acknowledged that addressing the issue of
mines/ERW inevitably raises political questions, be they related to security
concerns or matters of perception by the civilian population, that need to be dealt
with in the framework of a larger peace process. To some extent, this stands in
contrast to arguments for the depoliticisation of mine action found in the literature.
While there was an agreement that addressing mine action within a peace
process requires a high degree of trust and thus awareness of political
sensitivities, opinions diverged slightly when it comes to deciding whether mine
action issues should be discussed in the mediation process, for example in the
formal negotiations itself. Some do have a preference to tackle these issues
separately and the reason provided for this was that if linked, any progress made
related to the issue of mines/ERW would be subject to a successful conclusion
of a mediation process. This argument is backed up by the above-mentioned
example of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict42, which speaks in favour of a separate
negotiation track dealing with mines/ERW issues. This separate approach may
have the advantage of ‘keeping a process alive’ if the main negotiations are
blocked. Western Sahara is another example where the United Nations Mine
Action Service (UNMAS) maintains a mine action programme43 supporting
stabilisation while the official mediation process has been all but stuck in recent
years.
In spite of these advantages, most interviewees advocated for the formal
inclusion of mine action in mediation processes. The main argument for this
position was content-related, stating that once a peace agreement is signed and
implementation starts, that document becomes the main reference for all further
activities. In other words, many interviewees underlined that it would be difficult
to draw attention to mine action if these issues are not included in a peace or
ceasefire agreement. Hence, they concluded it was the responsibility of the
mediation team to at least raise the topic with conflict parties.
This in turn brings up further questions about how to do so. One recurrent
challenge that was mentioned in almost all interviews – and which also figures
prominently in the literature – is the lack of knowledge on all sides (including the
conflict parties but often also third parties facilitating peace talks) of what mine
action really is. This means that mediators have a role to play identifying those
knowledge gaps, raising awareness and preparing the ground for long-term
activities, which often involves the consultation of thematic experts.

42

On this case, we should say that even though humanitarian demining has made progress, the lack of a
peace agreement is a fundamental obstacle to clear the region completely as the front lines are kept.
HALO Trust conduct demining but not directly on the line of contact.

43

See: http://www.mineaction.org/programmes/westernsahara (accessed 03 October 2016).
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MINE ACTION AS A STEPPING STONE
FOR A MEDIATION PROCESS
It is often argued that mine action can be a useful confidence-building measure
(CBM), especially in prolonged conflicts. When the trust between conflict
parties is very low, it may be constructive to define certain areas of a territory
and start joint demining operations on a low scale. The objective of such activities
is to have parties work together on a common goal with the hope that this will
create a positive experience in which enemy forces have contact with each
other, cooperate and remain unharmed. This experience is then hoped to have a
stimulating effect on the peace process. The agreement of March 2015 between
the Colombian Government and the FARC-EP to start demining activities in the
Department of Antioquia is a good illustration of this logic. The initiative itself is
too small to have a physical impact on a national level. However, the main goal
is the symbolic effect of seeing members of the armed forces and the guerrilla
working for a common cause. This in turn may prepare the ground for more
comprehensive cooperation in this particular field. Meanwhile, the agreement also
aimed to reinforce the confidence of the two parties in the peace process at large.
Besides the parties directly involved in a conflict, mine action also requires
the communities to be taken into account. Depending on the context, civilian
populations may be sceptical towards a peace process and sensitive to the issue
of mines/ERW due to the damage inflicted on them. Therefore, CBMs may also
be directed towards the population, creating a concrete benefit as a result of the
peace process and demonstrating the commitment of the conflict parties to end
the conflict. This can therefore play a significant role in the strategy of a mediator
when designing a process. Again, Colombia serves as an example. Given the
long duration of the conflict and the failed attempts to resolve it in the past, the
population’s belief in the current peace process was very limited in the beginning.
Seeing that the negotiations produced only little tangible benefits, having the
conflict parties sharing responsibilities in mine action had certainly contributed
to increase the Colombian population’s confidence in the peace negotiations.44
Thus, notwithstanding the positive physical impact a small demining initiative may
have on the ground, the main objective of activities of this nature is to keep a
process moving or to get closer to a breakthrough in the negotiations. Mine action
at this stage is rarely an end in itself but rather a tool to be used carefully and in a
coordinated fashion in support of overarching peacemaking goals.

44

For an in-depth analysis of how popular support to the peace process in Colombia has changed over
time, see “Movilización por la Paz en Colombia: una infrestructura social clave para el posacuerdo”.
CINEP, March 2016. Accessed on 17 March 2016 at http://www.cinep.org.co/images/iniciativas_paz/
Informe_Datapaz_2.pdf.
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Mine action can also serve as an entry point to start a dialogue with conflict
parties. As a topic of concern to the wider population, it may be used to approach
conflict parties discussing, for instance, mine action-related conventions such as
APMBC, CCM, and Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in the
case of state actors and a Deed of Commitment (DoC) through Geneva Call in the
case of armed non-state actors (ANSAs). These first contacts can help establish a
regular line of communication, which may subsequently serve to discuss the
possibility of formally entering into a fully-fledged peace process. Parties’
commitments to not use certain weapons might then facilitate and prepare the
inclusion of mine action into a final ceasefire and/or peace agreement. An example
for this point is the Philippines, where the Government and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on the
Bangsamoro (CAB) on 27 March 2014 and the MILF had previously signed a DoC
(see box 2).

Box 2: Philippines
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) was reached
between the Government and MILF on 27 March 2014. The peace process that
led to this agreement began on 15 October 2012 with the Framework Agreement
on the Bangsamoro (FAB) and is meant to be completed in 2016 with the
establishment of a new self-government political entity replacing the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) created in 1989 as an evolution from the
Tripoli Agreement (1976).1 The CAB includes the FAB as an annex on normalisation,
which encompasses specific measures concerning mine action. The normalisation
refers to a process leading the communities to “achieve their desired quality of life,
which includes sustainable livelihood and political participation within a peaceful
deliberative society.” The annex on normalisation encompasses dispositions for
mines/ERW. It recalls the DoC2 on APM signed by MILF on 7 April 2002 and states
the commitment to clearance and MRE as part of the normalisation process.
1

Anton Chan, “’Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro’ – a Road map to Peace in the Southern
Philippines?”, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, vol. 6, issue 3, April 2014, p. 25.

2

Annex on Normalisation, 2014, pp. 6-7. See: http://peacemaker.un.org/document-search?keys=a
nnex+normalization&field_padate_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=2014&field_pacountry_
tid=Philippines&=Search+Peace+Agreements (accessed 26 June 2015).

26

Part II: Linking mine action and mediation

MINE ACTION IN CEASEFIRE AND PEACE AGREEMENTS
As soon as mine action is talked about in a long-term framework, the activities
entailed will change considerably. They will encompass clearing of mine-affected
territory throughout a country with monitoring mechanisms and several other
components that will outlast the signing of a ceasefire or peace agreement. So
while CBMs on a relatively small scale are rather straightforward and manageable
in terms of operations, the design of comprehensive mine action programmes
is a tremendous challenge and clearly a question of content. Those programmes
require the establishment of some form of institutional framework and therefore
need to be negotiated and agreed upon in writing by the conflict parties if they
are to be implemented. Accordingly, ceasefire45 and peace agreements are more
likely to contain provisions aiming at comprehensive demining as opposed to
shorter-term CBMs. CBMs, on the other hand, are more likely to be negotiated
and implemented on the side, not necessarily reflected in a written ceasefire or
peace agreement.
The above-mentioned guidelines of the UN Inter-Agency Coordination Group
on Mine Action (IACG-MA) suggest concrete steps on how to incorporate mine
action into negotiations and agreements. In this connection, the concern of the
interviewees for this issue brief was with the lack of expertise and information
during mediation processes that would hamper precise discussions and clear
commitment to the different mine action activities that are recommended by the
guidelines.
Furthermore, and especially in long-running conflicts, it is far from realistic to
believe that accurate information on where mines/ERW have been laid will be
available at the time of the negotiations. In many cases, mines/ERW will have
moved during heavy rain or floods and those who laid them may have been
killed during combat. Moreover, many countries will not have sufficient numbers
of people trained for demining activities. Thus, in many cases mine action does
not only suffer from a lack of will from the parties but also from the shortage of
knowledge and expertise.

45

It is noteworthy that not all ceasefire agreements are alike. Most importantly, they may be signed at
different stages of a peace process and thus be of a permanent or only preliminary nature. This should
also have an impact on how mine action would be taken into account. However, for this issue brief the
authors have not made a distinction between various forms of ceasefires, recognizing that it may be
advisable to do so in further research.
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Under these circumstances, the development of a fully-fledged mine action
programme to be written into a document is neither sensible nor feasible.
Therefore, mainly the mediation experts consulted for this study advocated for a
humble but strategic approach to the issue of mines/ERW. They argued to focus on
a set of questions and determine those actors who will be responsible for certain
steps to be taken. This should ensure that a skeleton of a mine action programme
exists but details will be negotiated after a peace agreement is signed.
Such a strategic approach would allow setting not only the basis for a mine
action programme, but also to connect it to other components and issues dealt
with in the agreement, in particular to DDR programmes. Many interviewees
emphasized that mine action can be a useful tool for the reintegration of former
combatants into civilian life. Being trained as a deminer may be a good way to
utilize the skills of those individuals in the interest of society at large while
providing the demobilised people with a new livelihood. An example of where
this was done successfully is Afghanistan46. Beyond this, it may be worthwhile to
explore interlinkages with other security-related topics. Not treating mine action
in isolation but instead putting it in the context of larger questions can have the
benefit of coordinating respective activities with other efforts and using potential
synergies. This being said, there may not always be the room and potential to do
so, which is why every case must be analysed in its own right.

46
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GICHD, Mine Action and Armed Violence Reduction. HALO Trust’s Reintegration of Former Combatants
into Demining. Afghanistan case study, Geneva, GICHD, 2012.
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CONCLUSION
Part I of this issue brief demonstrates that mine action is discussed and included in
mediation, but this link is neither self-evident nor without challenges. Humanitarian
demining can support peacemaking and peacebuilding, but this requires mine
action to adapt and more specifically to integrate a political dimension which may
be problematic from the perspective of humanitarian principles. The review of the
agreements also revealed frequent reference to mine action provisions, but these
are not as common and comprehensive as called for in the UN guidelines.
Interviews conducted for part II largely reflected the first findings. In fact, even
though addressing the problem of mines/ERW within mediation processes may
seem like a technical issue at first sight, the interviews conducted confirmed
that it is indeed a challenge of significant importance and, in addition, an underexplored topic in the field of peacemaking and peacebuilding.
In a nutshell, there are four recommendations for linking mine action and
mediation that stand out.
1. Discuss mine action in mediation:
The importance of discussing mine action in peace mediation and its potential as
a confidence building measure was emphasised by all interviewees. We therefore
consider it important that mediators promote this issue and discuss it with conflict
parties, and that a conscious choice on opportunities and challenges of addressing
mines/ERW be made. This does not always have to result in the formal inclusion
of mine action in peace negotiations. When negotiations are blocked, it may be
wiser to opt for a parallel negotiation track specifically focused on mines/ERW. It
thus cannot be emphasised enough how important it is to conduct a case by case
analysis when it comes to including mine action into formal mediation processes.
The first part of this issue brief shows that mine action can contribute to
peacemaking. However, practitioners should be aware of the fact that the
humanitarian origin of mine action does not naturally match the political
perspective inherent to a mediation process. As such, a distinction must be made
between awareness raising and advocacy, of which only the former lies within
the responsibilities of mediators. This entails bringing up the topic and providing
experts who can deliver technical information. When it comes to advocacy in
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favour of conventions and DoC, this should be left to other actors. Even though
such efforts can promote the commitment of mine action and possibly be an entry
point for negotiations or strengthen confidence, lobbying conflict parties bears the
risk for mediators to lose their legitimacy and credibility as impartial interlocutors.
2. Differentiate mine action before and after an agreement:
Another important finding of the research is that mine action is commonly referred
to in two distinct cases of circumstances, with very different implications. The
issue of mines/ERW is either addressed within a short timeframe through CBMs
or with a long-term perspective through comprehensive mine action programmes.
One may also argue that the issue is either taken up as an aspect of process or
content. However, practitioners rarely explicitly distinguish between the two. This
is problematic due to the very different nature of those two types of mine action.
CBMs usually serve as tools to advance an overall peace process and to establish
cooperation in a conflict environment on a clearly delineated field of activity. In
that sense, demining activities are used as a means to different ends. They are an
instrument to build confidence not only amongst the conflict parties themselves
and towards the mediation process, but also the confidence of the local
communities involved in the peace process. Similarly, discussions concerning
mine action in general and related conventions/commitments specifically can
provide an entry point to establish channels of communication with conflict
parties. In the search for a primary engagement to explore opportunities for
formal peace talks, mine action can thus serve as a first topic to be raised with
parties. Consequently, mine action activities in this framework are determined by
the needs of the mediation process and less by a humanitarian approach, clearly
becoming a political tool.
In contrast, fully-fledged mine action programmes directly aiming to clear national
territories from mines/ERW should consequently contribute to peacebuilding at
large through the content of written agreements.
These two forms of mine action are not mutually exclusive. In fact, they are
sometimes pursued in parallel, as is the case in Colombia. While mine action has
been conducted as a CBM, discussions are ongoing to agree on the course the
country will adopt in dealing with mines/ERW on a national level. This being said,
mediators and mine action practitioners must be clear on the differences between
the two. First and foremost, the different timeframes warrant a distinct strategic
approach. Moreover, mine action as an entry point or as a CBM would be part
of a mediation strategy whereas a mine action programme is the outcome of
negotiations concerning a concrete agenda item during a peace process.
30
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3. Incorporate the basic questions into the agreement:
The analysis of agreements showed the difficulty to clearly and conclusively
define the mine action activities to be undertaken as part of the implementation
of a ceasefire or peace agreement. Agreements define broad lines of action that
will be discussed and refined in more details once the implementation phase has
started. For this reason, it is also important to consider establishing joint bodies,
even with international missions, in charge of designing and steering mine action
programmes once a peace negotiation has been concluded.
More specifically, the following five questions were suggested as the basis for the
establishment of a functioning mine action programme:
•• What has to be done?
•• Who is responsible for what?
•• When does it have to be done?
•• Where will the funding come from?
•• How will the demining activities be monitored?

The absence of a reference to mine action in a ceasefire or peace agreement does
not necessarily mean the topic itself has not come up during a peace process.
As discussed, it may well have been used in a process-related manner. Thus, a
thorough assessment of where mine action has served as an entry point or has
been discussed in relation to CBMs, would warrant an analysis of the processes
leading to agreements and not merely the resulting documents. However, it was
not feasible to treat this topic within this issue brief’s scope. This would be an
interesting area for further research.
On a similar note, a better distinction should be made between ceasefire and
peace agreements. The UN guidelines do not separate the two and provide a set
of recommendations to be applied to both types of agreements. However, this
issue brief has clearly identified that mine action can be conceived as part of either
a process or the content of agreements. From this perspective, it is important
to bear in mind that ceasefire agreements are often only a step of an ongoing
process, which ideally leads to more comprehensive negotiations, whereas a
peace agreement is ordinarily the end of it. Therefore, mine action in a ceasefire
agreement could be interpreted as an instrument for confidence building rather
than defining a comprehensive programme for humanitarian demining. A better
differentiation between the recommendations for ceasefire or those for peace
agreements could be another avenue for further research on the topic.
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4. Foster interaction between mine action and mediation communities:
All consulted experts identified the lack of expertise and knowledge of mine
action as an obstacle in peace processes. Consequently, there is a need for
exchange and dialogue between mediation and mine action practitioners, sharing
experiences and exploring synergies. While mediators and conflict parties
alike seem to be struggling with the technical nature of mine action during
peace processes, representatives from demining organizations could bring the
know-how and experience to the table. Besides supporting mediators, these
representatives could provide conflict parties with a realistic assessment of their
country’s situation when it comes to mines/ERW. On the other hand, demining
operators would benefit from a better understanding of mine action’s political
implications and thus engaging with mediation practitioners. This would allow the
demining operators to adapt their activities to the context and avoid potential risks
they may otherwise be unaware of.
However, when asked about the exchange taking place between representatives
of the mine action and the mediation communities, respectively, all experts
revealed that there is virtually no contact whatsoever. This issue brief thus strongly
recommends a more strategic cooperation among these two fields of practice.
Especially during the initial phase of a mediation process where strategies are
designed and entry points are identified, an exchange about the situation of
mines/ERW in a given context is advisable if not imperative.
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ANNEXES
ANNEX I - UNITED NATIONS MINE ACTION GUIDELINES
FOR CEASEFIRE AND PEACE AGREEMENTS
Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action’s guidelines: 47
Background
1. In countries and regions emerging from violent conflict, mine action is often a
prerequisite to the return of refugees and Internally Displaced People (IDPs),
humanitarian aid, reconstruction and development. It is therefore of critical
importance that ceasefire agreements and peace accords properly address
mine action concerns and provide an appropriate framework for the effective
initiation and implementation of mine action activities.
2. Too often in the past, essential mine-related issues have either not been
addressed at all in cease-fire agreements and peace accords, or addressed
too late and inadequately. In the worst cases, they have been addressed in
a way that did not take account of technical realities and raised unrealistic
expectations, delaying the establishment of proper and effective mechanisms
for the implementation of mine action programmes.

Objective
3. This paper has been prepared to provide guidance to governments,
organizations, and individuals involved in the negotiation and drafting of
cease-fire agreements and peace accords. It aims to make them aware of the
mine action concerns that need to be addressed, or at least considered, in
such documents, and to help them draft appropriate references and clauses
related to mine action.

47

Source: LeBrun, Emile, Damman Suzanne, “Addressing explosive ordnance in peace processes”, op.
cit, pp. 25-26.
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Key mine-related concerns to be addressed
4. In situations where landmines are a significant obstacle to the resumption
of normal life and reconstruction, cease-fire agreements and peace accords
should consider and address seven sets of core mine action activities, related
to:
•• The exchange of technical information between all former parties to the

conflict

•• The marking of minefields and the eventual clearance of mines and UXO
•• Mine risk education
•• Victim assistance
•• Eliminating the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of mines
•• Stockpile destruction
•• International cooperation and coordination.

Exchange of technical information
5. The parties to the conflict should commit themselves to exchanging all
technical information required for the identification, location, marking and
eventual clearance of mines, minefields and UXO. The technical information
required should conform to the technical annex of Amended Protocol
Two of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) that is
attached at annex two to this document, and should include maps and
information regarding the specific types of unexploded ordnance that
could be encountered. The parties should assist with the interpretation of
the information exchanged, codes and symbols used in maps and other
documents in particular, as well as their translation when required.
6. The agreements may designate the Secretary General of the United Nations,
or another intermediary, to serve as the receiver of such information and
facilitate the exchange process. Realistic deadlines should be set for the
completion of the exchange of the information.
7. In many cases the available information may not be sufficient to allow for
the safe implementation of mine clearance activities and survey operations
will have to be conducted. In such instances the parties should commit
themselves to facilitating unimpeded access to survey teams including flights
for the purposes of aerial photography.
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Minefield marking and mine and UXO clearance
8. The parties to the conflict should commit themselves to actively supporting
the identification, marking and eventual clearance of all minefields and
UXO. Clear and realistic responsibilities and timelines should be defined in
this regard, taking into consideration the technical capacities of the parties
involved, and the need to ensure that operations are conducted effectively
and safely, in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards
(IMAS). All marking and clearance activities should be reported to the
designated mine action authorities.

Mine Risk Education
9. The parties to the conflict should commit themselves to actively identifying
those people who are most at risk of suffering mine or UXO accidents
and support the prompt development of Mine Risk Education (MRE)
programmes, which seek to prevent or reduce occurrences of related
deaths and injuries. MRE programmes should be undertaken within a
rights-based framework, which recognizes the legal and moral obligation and
accountability of states to the rights and needs of their peoples. Accordingly,
MRE programmes should be integrated with appropriate peace-building
activities.

Victim assistance
10. The parties should commit themselves to providing assistance for the care
and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims.

The use, production, transfer and stockpiling
of antipersonnel mines
11. The parties to the accord should commit themselves to immediately
stopping the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of mines, especially
antipersonnel mines. For governments, this commitment should involve
ratification of, or accession to the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Convention,
attached at annex three. For Non State Actors, this could involve signing the
“Deed of Commitment” deposited with the Government of the Republic and
Canton of Geneva, attached at annex four.

Stockpile destruction
12. The parties to the conflict should commit themselves to the total destruction
of all stockpiles of landmines, antipersonnel mines in particular, under their
possession or control. Realistic deadlines for the destruction of stockpiles
should be contained in the peace accord or cease-fire agreement. Stockpile
destruction operations should respect all relevant IMAS.
Annexes
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International cooperation and coordination
13. The parties to the conflict should normally commit themselves to inviting
international cooperation for mine action. When necessary, the parties
should agree to request international assistance through the United Nations
or other organizations, to facilitate the safe and timely conduct of all mine
action activities, in particular during the initial implementation phase of the
agreement.
14. The parties should be encouraged to conduct mine action activities in
response to clear humanitarian and socio economic needs so that priority is
given to the most vulnerable.

Note: These guidelines have been endorsed by the Inter Agency Coordination
Group on Mine Action (IACG-MA), which comprises the following UN bodies,
DPKO, DDA, OCHA, FAO, OHCHR, UNDP, UNHCHR, United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOPS, WFP, WHO, and the
World Bank.
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ANNEX II - QUESTIONNAIRE
Interview questions
1. How often would you say are issues linked to mines/ERW and mine action,
addressed within a mediation process? And how frequently do agreements
contain provisions for mine action?
2. In your experience, what are crucial aspects within a mediation process that
make mine action a topic? Does it depend on certain actors, circumstances,
timing, etc.?
3. Do you see linkages between questions related to mines/ERW and other
topics discussed during a mediation process? If so what are they and how do
they manifest themselves?
4. In contexts where mines/ERW are an issue, would you advocate for its
inclusion in a mediation process or would you rather treat it as a technical
endeavour on the side?
5. Have you ever experienced reluctance by any of the actors involved in a
peace process to include mine action? If so, what were the reasons for the
reservations?
6. What has been the most successful strategy in your experience to address
mine action within a larger peace process (not limited to the mediation
process)?
7. How could the inclusion of long-term mine action engagements be
sequenced? What should be discussed at the peace table and when?
8. Is there anything you would like to add?
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ANNEX III - LIST OF AGREEMENTS
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#

Agreements/documents

Date of the agreement

Country/Entity

1

Lebanese-Israeli General Armistice
Agreement

23 March 1949

Lebanon, Israel

2

General Armistice Agreement

20 July 1949

Israel, Syria

3

Hashemite Jordan Kingdom-Israel:
General Armistice

03 April 1949

Israel, Jordan

4

Peace Treaty Between the State of Israel
and the Arab Republic of Egypt

26 March 1979

Israel, Egypt

5

Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities
(i.e. 'Geneva Agreements')

20 July 1954

Cambodia, Lao PDR,
Vietnam

6

Definitive ceasefire agreement between
the Government of the Republic of
Nicaragua and the “Yatama” Atlantic Front
of Nicaraguan Resistance

18 April 1990

Nicaragua

7

Framework for a Comprehensive Political
Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict (i.e.
"the Paris Agreement")

23 October 1991

Cambodia

8

General Peace Agreement for
Mozambique

04 October 1992

Mozambique

9

Protocol of Negotiations between the
Governmental Delegations of the Republic
of Georgia and the Russian Federation

09 April 1993

Georgia, Russia

10

Agreement for the Demilitarisation of
Srebrenica

18 April 1993

Bosnia and Herzegovina

11

Cease-fire Agreement of 29 March 1994

29 March 1994

Croatia

12

Lusaka Protocol

15 November 1994

Angola

13

General Framework Agreement for Peace
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (i.e. 'Dayton
Agreement')

21 November 1995

Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia and the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia

14

Agreement on the Implementation,
Compliance and Verification Timetable for
the Peace Agreements

29 December 1996

Guatemala

15

Sudan Peace Agreement (i.e. Khartoum
Agreement)

21 April 1997

Sudan

16

Interim Agreement for Peace and SelfGovernment in Kosovo (i.e. 'Rambouillet
Accords')

23 February 1999

Kosovo, Serbia
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#

Agreements/documents

Date of the agreement

Country/Entity

17

Military Technical Agreement Between the
International Security Force (KFOR) and
the Governments of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia

09 June 1999

Kosovo, Serbia

18

UN Security Council Resolution 1244
(1999) on the Situation Relating to Kosovo

10 June 1999

Kosovo

19

Undertaking of Demilitarisation and
Transformation by the UCK (i.e. Kosovo
Liberation Army, KLA)

20 June 1999

Kosovo

20

Peace Agreement between the
Government of Sierra Leone and the
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone
(RUF/SL) ('the Lomé Peace Agreement')

07 July 1999

Sierra Leone

21

Technical Arrangements for the
Implementation of the Organisation
of African Unity (OAU) Framework
Agreement

31 August 1999

Ethiopia, Eritrea

22

Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities
between the Government of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the
Government of the State of Eritrea

19 June 2000

Ethiopia, Eritrea

23

Arusha Peace and Reconciliation
Agreement for Burundi

28 August 2000

Burundi

24

Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement
on Sudan

19 January 2002

Sudan

25

Ceasefire Agreement between the
Transitional Government of Burundi and
the Conseil National pour la Défense de la
Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la
Démocratie (CNDD-FDD)

02 December 2002

Burundi

26

Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the
Conflict in Darfur

02 April 2004

Sudan

20 November 2004

Angola, Burundi, Central
African Republic,
Republic of Congo,
Democratic Republic of
Congo, Rwanda, Sudan,
Tanzania, Uganda,
Zambia

27

Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Peace,
Security, Democracy and Development in
the Great Lakes Region
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#

Agreements/documents

Date of the agreement

Country/Entity

28

Zinguinchor Peace Agreement between
Government of Senegal and the
Movement of the Democratic Forces of
Casamance (MFDC)

30 December 2004

Senegal

29

Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and
Security Arrangements Implementation
Modalities between the Government
of the Sudan and the Sudan People's
Liberation Movement/Sudan People's
Liberation Army (SPLM/A) during the PreInterim and Interim Periods

31 December 2004

Sudan, South Sudan

30

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement
between the Government of the Republic
of the Sudan and the Sudan People's
Liberation Movement/Sudan People's
Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA)

09 January 2005

Sudan, South Sudan

31

Comprehensive Peace Accord signed
between the Nepal Government and the
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)

22 November 2006

Nepal

32

Agreement on the Monitoring of the
Management of Arms and Armies

08 December 2006

Nepal

33

Comprehensive Agreement on the
Bangsamoro

27 March 2014

The Philippines

34

Agreement on the Resolution of the
Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan

17 August 2015

South Sudan

35

The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement
between the Government of the Republic
of the Union of Myanmar and the Ethnic
Armed Organisations

15 October 2015

Myanmar
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ANSAs		
Armed non-state
actors
APM		
Anti-personnel mines
APMBC		
Anti-Personnel Mine
Ban Convention
ARMM		
Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao
AVM		
Anti-vehicle mines
CAB		
Comprehensive Peace
Agreement on the
Bangsamoro
CBM		
Confidence Building
Measure
CCM		
Convention on Cluster
Munition
CCW		
Convention on
Certain Conventional
Weapons

CM		
Cluster munitions
CNAMS		
Senegalese National
Mine Action Centre
DDR		
Disarmament,
demobilisation and
rehabilitation
DoC		
Deed of Commitment
ERW		
Explosive remnants of
war
FAB		
Framework
Agreement on the
Bangsamoro

ICBL		
International
Campaign to Ban
Landmines
IDP		
Internally displaced
people
IED		
Improvised explosive
device
IFOR		
Implementation Force
IMAS		
International Mine
Action Standards
INGO		
International nongovernmental
organisation

FARC-EP		
Revolutionary Armed
KFOR		
Forces of Colombia
Kosovo Force
HD
Centre for
Humanitarian Dialogue
IACG-MA
Inter-Agency
Coordination Group
on Mine Action

MFDC		
Movement of
Democratic Forces of
Casamance
MILF		
Moro Islamic
Liberation Front

List of abbreviations

41

MRE		
Mine risk education
NGO		
Non-governmental
organisation
OSCE 		
Organization for
Security and
Co-operation in
Europe
SSR		
Security sector reform

42

List of abbreviations

swisspeace
Swiss Peace
Foundation

UNSG		
Secretary-General of
the United Nations

UN		
United Nations

URNG		
Guatemalan National
Revolutionary Unit

UNMAS		
United Nations Mine
Action Service
UNPROFOR
United Nations
Protection Force

UXO		
Unexploded ordnance
VA		
Victim assistance

Follow us on
gichd.org
facebook
twitter
linkedin
youtube

Geneva International Centre
for Humanitarian Demining
Maison de la paix, Tower 3
Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2C
PO Box 1300
CH – 1211 Geneva 1, Switzerland
info@gichd.org

